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 Unemployment and AIDS:  The Social-
Democratic Challenge for South Africa 
 
 
 
There are two major economic and social security challenges facing South 
Africa: addressing large-scale unemployment and the AIDS pandemic.  As of 
2003, an estimated 14% of all South Africans were HIV-positive, with over a 
thousand people dying each day of AIDS.
1  According to the government 
household and labour-force surveys conducted from the mid-1990s onwards, 
about a third of the labour force is without work (Nattrass, 2000a).  This 
amounts to about 4.7 million people and it is, without question, a socio-
economic crisis of major proportions.  The life-chances and living-standards of 
entire households are compromised when working-age adults cannot find 
employment (Seekings, 2003b).  Households burdened by AIDS are in an 
especially difficult position (Desmond et al 2000, Steinberg et al 2002a, 2002b; 
Booysen, 2002; Booysen et al, 2002). 
  
Addressing AIDS and unemployment poses major challenges for social 
solidarity in South Africa.  Over the past decade, the labour-market and 
industrial-policy environment has benefited relatively high-productivity firms 
and sectors (Nattrass, 2001).  Business thus had strong incentives to reduce 
dependence on unskilled labour, and once the price of highly active 
antiretroviral therapy (HAART) started to fall from 2001 onwards, to supply it, 
either directly or indirectly through medical aids, to their increasingly skilled 
workforce
2 (Nattrass, 2003).  Those without jobs had neither access to earned 
income nor life-prolonging medication.  
 
In August 2003, the government signalled its in-principle support for the 
provision of HAART in the public sector.  Many unemployed people with AIDS 
will thus be able to access treatment, although this will depend on the scale and 
pace of the roll-out.  A full-scale treatment intervention which reaches all who 
need it is feasible, but will require a substantial commitment of resources 
(Geffen et al, 2003).  If resources are not to be directed from other priorities, the 
cost burden will fall on income-earners in the form of higher taxation.   Given 
South Africa’s high levels of unemployment, this means that the burden of 
providing treatment for all will fall on a relatively small pool of income-earners.  
                                                 
1 These figures were generated by the ASSA2000 Interventions Model.  
2 See Rosen and Simon (2002) for a discussion of how business is shifting the burden of 
AIDS onto households and the State, and Rosen et al (2000) on when business has an 
incentive to provide AIDS treatment to its workers.   2
 
Under these conditions, employers and workers may calculate that they stand to 
benefit more from a more limited (and less expensive in terms of increased 
taxation) public sector treatment intervention, than a programme providing 
universal access.  Two out of the three leading South African macroeconomic 
models predict that the pandemic will increase per capita income because the 
impact will be greater on the population than on growth (Nattrass, 2003).  If the 
AIDS pandemic is perceived as being likely to result in an increase in per capita 
income, then the elite may regard it as in their best interests to do very little 
significant to halt the epidemic or alleviate its consequences.  Those with the 
economic means to better protect themselves and their families against HIV 
infection (by providing access to education, condoms, healthy diets and safer 
life-style choices),  and who have access to medical schemes to treat themselves 
and their loved ones if they become infected, may think their interests are better 
served by a ‘do-very-little’ scenario.  They may privately calculate that they 
stand to benefit more as individuals from a set of policies which prioritises 
economic growth and minimises taxation, than they would from a social 
response that includes universal access to HAART and entails higher taxation 
and spending cuts in other areas.   They would, of course, be wrong to think that 
they can entirely insulate themselves in this way from the AIDS pandemic.   But 
if they believe they can, this course of action may seem preferable.    
 
This has implications for social solidarity regarding AIDS treatment.  For 
example, organised labour may well baulk at the tax implications of a full-scale 
tax-financed AIDS intervention.  Many workers are already able to access 
HAART through their employers or medical aids and most live in urban areas 
(which are at the front of the queue in the treatment roll-out because the greatest 
capacity to deliver treatment is in the large urban hospitals).  Employed workers 
may thus have an incentive to support a limited roll-out (with correspondingly 
less onerous tax implications for their pay packets) rather than a large-scale 
intervention aimed at reaching all those who need it.  
 
The structural problem at the root of all this is South Africa’s high 
unemployment rate – especially among the less skilled.  Section 1 places South 
Africa in a comparative perspective and summarises the historical roots of the 
unemployment crisis.  Section 2 discusses various ways of addressing the 
unemployment problem in the light of the AIDS pandemic, and Section 3 
considers the question of how to combat AIDS and unemployment/poverty 
through a social accord process.  
 
  3
1.  South Africa’s Unemployment and Welfare  
     Crisis 
 
Until the mid-1970s, the South African economy was plagued by chronic labour 
shortages.  In this regard, South Africa experienced the typical Sub-Saharan 
problem of labour-constrained development:  either a labour supply had to be 
created through extra-economic coercive mechanisms, or relatively high wages 
had to be offered in the capitalist sector (Karshenas, 2001).  The uniquely South 
African solution to this problem comprised a set of racially discriminatory and 
coercive policies which undermined independent peasant production and 
channelled relatively cheap African labour to mines, commercial farms and 
industry.  Apartheid policies affected different parts of the economy in different 
ways (Lipton, 1985) and probably eroded long-term growth (Moll, 1991).   
Nevertheless, the coercive creation of a cheap labour force was a crucial 
ingredient in the early phase of South African economic history.   
 
Not only was the process of deagrarianisation and proletarianisation more 
extensive in South Africa than elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the pace of 
industrial development far outstripped the rest of the continent.  Development, 
fuelled in part by gold revenues and foreign capital, sucked labour out of 
traditional agriculture and facilitated rapid urbanisation.  But this engine of 
growth slowed down sharply in the mid-1970s.
3  Apart from the brief (gold-
financed) boom in the early 1980s, the South African economy has performed 
poorly ever since.  This has had serious consequences for average living 
standards.  Real per capita income in 2002 is lower than it was twenty years 
earlier.       
 
By the end of the 1970s, open unemployment had become a major problem.  
The situation worsened as the economy limped through the late 1980s and into 
the 1990s.  At the dawn of democracy in 1994, over a third of the African labour 
force was unable to find work (Nattrass, 2000a).  Conditions declined further in 
the 1990s as formal sector employment contracted significantly.  As can be seen 
in Figure 1, manufacturing employment increased marginally in the mid-1990s, 
but nosedived thereafter.  Public sector employment helped boost overall 
employment until the mid-1990s, but has, since 1996, contracted alongside 
private sector non-agricultural employment (see Figure 1).  Agriculture has also 
shed significant numbers of jobs (Simbi and Aliber, 2000).  Informal 
employment rose slightly in the late 1990s, but not by enough to prevent the 
trend rise in unemployment.   
 
                                                 
3 Average economic growth slowed down from 5.6% per annum in the 1960s, to 3% in the 
1970s, and then to about 1.5% in the 1980s.  4
        
Figure 1:  Trends in Non-agricultural formal employment in the 1990s  
                (data from the South African Reserve Bank).  
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Unemployment rates are especially high amongst the youth (Nattrass, 2002), i.e. 
those most devastated by AIDS.  Figure 2 shows that South Africa’s 
unemployment rates, when compared to other middle-income developing 
countries are, literally, ‘off the charts’.  This is a result of South Africa’s 
comparatively weak historical performance with regard to both employment and 
output growth (see Figures 4 and 5).  To make matters worse, South Africa’s 
growth path has become even less employment friendly since 1990, largely 
because of ongoing structural change, the impact of technological change and 
rising wage and non-wage labour costs (Fedderke and Mariotti, 2002).   
 
A range of factors have contributed to South Africa’s poor employment 
performance since the mid-1970s.  These include slow growth, tariff protection 
for ever-more capital-intensive sectors and large-scale strategic investments by 
the state (Kaplinsky, 1995).  During the 1970s and early 1980s, the coincidence 
of rising wages and negative real interest rates meant that the cost of capital 
relative to labour fell to about half the level it had been in the 1960s (Meintjes, 
1998: 11-12).  Tax breaks for capital investment further encouraged firms 
throughout the economy to adopt more labour-saving techniques.  The change to 
positive real interest policies and the depreciation of the Rand in the mid-1980s 
reversed the downward trend in the user-cost of capital but failed to boost  5
employment growth significantly.  The net result was that the South African 
industrial sector became steadily more capital-intensive over time.  
 
Figure 2:  Unemployment Rates in Middle-Income Countries   
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Source:  World Development Indicators as reported in the WEFA data set and StatsSA 
 
 
One of the contributing factors to this trend was developments in the labour 
market.  Under apartheid, independent African trade unions were denied access 
to industrial councils (where wage bargaining took place at industry-level).  In 
1979, the Wiehahn Commission recommended full trade union rights for 
Africans.  This was implemented shortly thereafter, and by the mid-1980s, 
African trade unions were participating in industrial councils (now called 
‘bargaining councils’).
4  African trade unions were able to use their new-found 
institutional muscle to push up wages – especially for relatively low-paid 
workers (Hofmeyr, 1994).  To the extent that such wage pressures encouraged 
firms to adopt labour-saving techniques (Nattrass, 2000b), these trends would 
have contributed to the increase in capital-intensity.
5  Other pressures include the 
                                                 
4 Not all workers, however, were covered by industrial council agreements.  The impact of 
deracialising the industrial council system, was thus to ‘recycle’ the old apartheid wedge 
between white and black workers, into a wedge between ‘insiders’, i.e. workers covered by 
industrial councils, and ‘outsiders’ i.e. those in poorly-paying uncovered sectors such as 
agriculture and services, and the unemployed (Moll, 1996).   
5 Most calculations of employment elasticity in South Africa indicate that the labour demand 
curve is relatively elastic.  Estimates typically range from –0,66 to –0,85, which suggests that 
a 10% increase in wages will result in a drop in employment of between 6,6 percent and 8,5 
percent (reported in the EAGER Report, no.10, Spring 1999: 7).  6
rise in non-wage labour costs, such as costs relating to hiring and firing, and, of 
course, costs relating to AIDS (Nattrass, 2003).  
 
 
Wages, Employment and Profitability: 1990-2001 
 
Those who lost employment (or failed to find it) were the big losers in the 
1990s.  By contrast, the owners of capital and those (predominantly skilled) 
workers who retained their jobs did relatively well.  Figure 3 shows that real 
average remuneration rose as employment fell during the 1990s.  This reflects 
the fact that as the South African economy restructured towards the more skill- 
and capital-intensive sectors and enterprises, the skill composition of 
employment shifted in favour of more skilled (and better paid) workers 
(Fedderke and Mariotti (2002: 840-1).   Formal employment now has a far 
higher concentration of ‘good jobs’.  The price has been fewer jobs for others.  
 
 
Figure 3:  Index of Labour Productivity, Employment, Average Wages  
                and Profitability in South Africa 
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     Source: South African Reserve Bank 
 
How has this trend affected profitability?  On the one hand, firms have had to 
contend with sharp increases in labour costs.  On the other hand, however, they 
have been able to secure an increase in labour productivity.  By restructuring 
and down-sizing their workforces, they have, on average, ensured that each  7
remaining worker contributes more on average to output than had been the case 
when employment was higher.  As they have been able to secure faster growth 
in productivity than real average wages, this has been good for profitability.   
 
One rough indication of profitability is the gross profit share (i.e. the share of 
gross output going to the owners of capital).  Broadly speaking, if the growth in 
labour productivity is greater than the growth in real wages, then workers are 
contributing more to output growth than they are getting back in wages, and 
hence the share of output going to capitalists (the profit share) will rise.  Figure 
3 show that the average rate of growth of productivity exceeded that of real 
wages for most of the 1990s.  As a result, the aggregate profit share was about 
10% higher in 2001 than it was in 1990.  Capitalists have also benefited from 
rising rates of profit (i.e. the rate of return on capital) in most sectors.  This can 
be seen in Figure 3 which shows how the average net profit rate
6 has increased 
since 1990.      
 
The general rise in labour productivity and in the proportion of skilled workers 
in total employment in the 1990s is consistent with government policy to drive 
the economy ‘up the value chain’ – i.e. to cajole and force the economic 
structure to shift towards a more skill-intensive growth path.  This ‘high 
productivity now’ strategy entails a mixture of incentives to encourage training 
and the development of high value-added forms of economic activity, as well as 
continued support for those aspects of labour-market policy that hinder low-
wage, labour-intensive job creation (Nattrass, 2001).  As argued above, the 
strategy appears to have benefited those workers who managed to keep their 
jobs because real wages grew significantly.  But, unlike other countries that have 
successfully pursued this strategy such as Ireland (see below), this ‘high 
productivity’ strategy has done nothing yet to improve the economy’s ability to 
create jobs.   
 
South Africa’s growth strategy may well deliver benefits in terms of income 
growth in the longer-term.  Its success, however, is dependent on skills 
development and on high and sustained rates of investment.  The government’s 
orthodox economic policy (GEAR) framework is premised on investment 
becoming the driving force for growth (Nattrass, 1996).  The hope was that 
investors would respond well to falling inflation and the budget deficit.   
Unfortunately, investment has not responded as quickly or extensively as hoped 
by the GEAR macroeconomic modellers, and growth has been sluggish for the 
past decade.  Some of the reasons for this lack-lustre performance were beyond 
the control of economic policy-makers.  The Asian crisis and over-zealous 
monetary policies by the independent reserve bank both acted as unexpected 
                                                 
6 This is the average for all sectors excluding community social and personal services which 
comprises most government services.   8
economic brakes.  It is a moot point whether the government should have 
continued with its restrictive fiscal policies given the recessionary conditions of 
the time (Weeks, 1999). 
 
Rapid capital accumulation (and even rising capital-intensity) is desirable if it is 
accompanied by significant growth in employment.  The policy gamble taken by 
the South African government is that the shift to greater capital- and skill-
intensity will provide a new engine for sustainable growth in the medium- to 
longer-term.  Unfortunately, skill shortages (which are currently driving up the 
price of skilled labour relative to unskilled labour) will continue to act as a 
constraint on growth, and the brain-drain of young professionals will exacerbate 
the situation for some time.  The AIDS pandemic is likely to worsen the skills 
shortage (Nattrass, 2003).       
 
In short, the South African growth path has become increasingly skill- and 
capital-intensive, and has delivered benefits to both capital and labour.  In this 
post-apartheid ‘distributional regime’, the unemployed have been the biggest 
losers (Seekings and Nattrass, 2004).  They are marginal to South Africa’s high 
productivity growth path, and their deaths from AIDS are likely to have less of 
an impact on the economy than the deaths of employed workers.  If the only 
objective of government policy was to promote growth, then prolonging the 
lives of the unemployed would probably feature low down the government’s list 
of priorities (Nattrass, 2004).
7    
 
Ultimately, the discussion about AIDS interventions has to entail social 
concerns and values.  Should we as a society sit back and let all those who are 
marginal to the process of income-generation die – or should we do something 
about it?  What is the reasonable response to this major challenge for social 
justice?  The problem with this question, however, is that it immediately poses 
the question of what else we could be doing as a  society to help the 
unemployed.  What is an appropriate balance between addressing AIDS and 
addressing unemployment and poverty?   Given the strong connection between 
poverty and HIV transmission (Stillwaggon, 2002; Nattrass, 2003), it follows 
that anti-poverty measures should be an integral aspect of any AIDS 
intervention strategy.  The challenge, in other words, amounts to how best to 
address poverty and AIDS together.   This issue is addressed in Section 2 below.  
 
 
                                                 
7 This, of course, could be a miscalculation because providing treatment for those with AIDS 
(whether employed or unemployed) is likely to lower the rate of HIV transmission (Johnson 
and Dorrington, 2002).  In other words, the social benefits exceed the sum of the individual 
benefits for HAART patients.      9
2.  Addressing Unemployment, Poverty and 
     AIDS 
 
There are two broad ways for government to respond the challenge of 
unemployment and poverty: through direct interventions (e.g. income support 
and/or public works); and through policy measures to make the growth path 
more labour-demanding.   
 
 
Direct Government Intervention 
 
South Africa’s welfare system provides for the young (through child grants), the 
elderly (through generous non-contributory pensions) and the disabled.  The 
underlying assumption is one of full-employment, i.e. that able-bodied adults 
can provide for themselves through work (Nattrass and Seekings, 1997).  As a 
result, unemployed people rely on pensioners, transfers from employed family 
members and (increasingly) on disability grants to survive.   
 
The South African government faces significant fiscal exposure to the AIDS 
epidemic through the welfare system.  A government means-tested disability 
grant of a maximum of R700 a month is available to all ‘severely physically and 
mentally disabled people’ older than 18.  This includes people living with AIDS.  
However, there is no clear policy on AIDS-related disability grants (Boulle, 
2003). Means-tested caretaker grants are also available to the care-takers of 
disabled children (including those affected by AIDS).     
 
In 2001, 643,000 people were receiving disability grants, which, in the opinion 
of Van der Berg and Bredenkamp, was a surprisingly low figure given the 
eligibility criteria (2002: 50).   However, by October 2002, the number of 
disability grants had risen sharply to 831,271.  Simkins observes that this 
“probably reflects an increase in take up rates as well as the rising number of 
people disabled by the development of full-blown AIDS” (2003: 8).  Between 
April 2001 and June 2002, the number of child care dependency grants also 
increased substantially.  This trend may also be in part a result of “the 
emergence of claims for children seriously ill as a result of HIV infection” (ibid, 
2003: 11).  Assuming a constant take-up rate for the non-AIDS disabled, and a 
rise in the take-up rate for the AIDS-disabled, Simkins estimates that the number 
of disability grants will rise to 1,236,847 in 2010.
8  The costs to the government 
will rise from R6.4 billion to R9.5 billion as a result (2003: 9).  Costs associated 
                                                 
8 The Fiscal and Financial Commission has warned that this figure may be an under-
estimate, and that more AIDS-related disability grants are likely in the future (Cape Times, 
16/5/03).   10
with care dependency grants could also increase substantially as a result of 
AIDS (Barberton, 2000).  
 
The government, after years of procrastination and obfuscation, has recently 
indicated that a HAART will be made available through the public sector (Cape 
Times, 8 August, 2003), albeit, no doubt, on a limited and highly controlled 
basis.  Those who are able to access the programme and who respond well to 
treatment will in many cases (although this seems to vary across the country) be 
no longer be eligible for a disability grant.  The government would thus ‘save’ a 
significant portion of increase projected by Simkins.   The problem with this 
scenario, however, is that the loss of the disability grant may have serious 
financial and other implications for people living with AIDS.  Welfare transfers, 
like pensions and disability grants, are important components of household 
income – particularly for the very poor (Leibbrandt et al, 2000; Seekings 
2003b).   
 
For many people living with AIDS, the disability grant is, unsurprisingly, a 
major source of relief.  One of the respondents interviewed as part of a broader 
study of the impact of AIDS, went as far as to say “I love this HIV” because of 
it.  She explained her choice of words as follows:   
 
“Yes I like this HIV/AIDS because we have grants to support us….. 
Before I was staying with my mother and father and sister, they didn’t 
work.  Maybe I was taking three to four days without food.  People 
discriminated against me and no one come in the house.  The only 
thing that was helping was my grandmother’s pension.  We were 
surviving on that money.  Concerning the illness, our lives are 
changed completely” (quoted in Steinberg et al, 2002b: 29).  
 
The notion that someone might ‘love this HIV’ seems shocking.  But it is 
understandable (albeit in a terrible way) when one considers the desperate 
circumstances that households can find themselves when they lack access to an 
income-earner.  The advent of a disability grant, as was clearly the case for the 
respondent quoted above, is a major life-line for the entire family.  The threat of 
its removal as a result of HAART is thus serious indeed.  There is thus a case for 
reducing, but not removing altogether, the disability grant for those on HAART.  
This, however, raises a further question: why privilege people on HAART 
(whose immune systems have been reconstituted as a result) over those who are 
equally poor, but are HIV-negative?).  In other words, rather than introducing a 
new, lower, grant to replace the disability grant – why not introduce a basic 
income grant (BIG) for all South Africans?   
  11
Welfare support for the poor could be provided in two ways: via a means-tested 
system (a ‘dole’); or through a universal BIG.  The advantage of the latter is that 
it wastes fewer resources on bureaucracy.  A BIG of R100 per month for all 
South Africans could contribute substantially to reducing poverty and inequality 
in South Africa.  According to Bhorat (2002), the numbers of people living 
below the poverty line would fall by about two-thirds.  Interestingly there 
appears to be wide-spread support for the introduction of a BIG in South Africa, 
ranging from the opposition Democratic Alliance to the socialist left (Matisonn 
and Seekings, 2002).  But there is less agreement about how to finance it.  The 
recent ‘Taylor Committee’ report on comprehensive welfare reform argued in 
favour of a BIG (Taylor Committee, 2002), but was curiously silent about how it 
should be financed.    
 
The ‘People’s Budget’
9 (supported by COSATU, the South African Council of 
Churches and the South African NGO Coalition) proposed that part of the 
needed revenue could be raised through a ‘solidarity levy’ in the form of a 
17.5% surcharge on income tax for the top two quintiles – and the rest in the 
form of increased taxation of ‘the high income group’.  This is broadly in line 
with the COSATU 7
th National Congress resolution that the cost of the BIG 
must ‘fall on the rich’.  By contrast, Le Roux (2002) proposes that the BIG be 
financed by a 7.3 percentage point increase in value-added tax (VAT) and a 50% 
increase in excise and fuel taxes.  The advantage of Le Roux’s proposal is that it 
is broad-based and redistributive.  Those who spend more than R1, 000 a month 
end up paying more in consumption taxes than they benefit from the R100 
universal grant.   
 
Despite the wide-ranging support for a BIG, the South African government has 
been reluctant to endorse it.  One source of concern is the ‘hand-out’ nature of 
the grant, which is in many circles (including government) deemed less 
desirable than providing people with the ‘dignity of work’ through direct job 
creation.  Those who believe that citizens have an obligation to work are also 
opposed to a BIG.  Another concern, perhaps, is that the R100 a month grant, 
once implemented, could become a political site of struggle over the size of the 
grant.  As Le Roux (2002) has shown, the net cost of a BIG (financed out of 
VAT) will be about R15 billion a year, i.e. a few billion more than the 
government is currently spending on the gross cost of old age pensions.  If the 
grant were to double or triple (as a result of demands from voters), then the cost 
implications would be serious indeed.      
 
There are, of course, other ways of channelling income into the hands of the 
unemployed.  An obvious alternative to a grant is to ‘self-target’ the 
                                                 
9 The ‘People’s Budget’ is available on www.cosatu.org.za  12
unemployed by offering low-wage jobs through a government-funded national 
public works programme (PWP).  Low-wage PWPs target the poor (because 
only the poor will work for low wages) without undermining the labour market.  
Properly designed PWPs have the potential to alleviate poverty (McCord, 2002) 
and have the additional benefit of creating assets (e.g. building roads, removing 
alien vegetation from water courses etc.).  The disadvantage of PWPs (relative 
to a BIG) is that a substantial proportion of resources (typically between 40-
50%) are absorbed by administration – rather than being channelled more 
directly to the poor via wages.  The more complex the PWP (e.g. those that 
attempt to provide some skills training as well), the greater the proportion of 
resources is absorbed by management, and the greater the risk of inefficiency 
and failure.   
 
Nevertheless, the experience of Chile has shown, it is possible to absorb a high 
proportion of the unemployed in government-funded and managed PWPs 
(Cortaza, 1997).
10  According to McCord (2003), it would cost South Africa 
R22.8 billion to provide low wage employment for 2.6 million unemployed 
people a year
11 (i.e. about one third of the 7.7 million who report that they do not 
have jobs and would like one).  This is more than the net cost of a BIG (which, 
as noted above, Le Roux estimates to be in the region of about R15 billion a 
year) and about the same as the (mid-point estimate of) the cost of a full-scale 
AIDS intervention including HAART (Nattrass and Geffen, 2003).     
 
But whether the South African state has the capacity at all levels of government 
to implement such a national PWP successfully, however, is a good question.  
Recent scandals concerning corruption and inefficiency in the delivery of 
pensions in the Eastern Cape indicate that in poorer parts of the country, such 
capacity is likely to be lacking.  This is a major problem from the point of view 
of inequality because it is precisely these areas which require well targeted and 
designed PWPs the most.  One of the big limitations of PWPs is the high 
proportion of expenditure that gets channelled to the bureaucrats administering 
the projects rather than to the wages of beneficiaries.  If the bureaucrats do not 
do a good job ensuring that the PWPs reach the poorest people – and in the most 
efficient manner, then the redistributive impact of the programme is seriously 
weakened.   Under the circumstances then, it is likely that a BIG will be better 
targeted than a national PWP, and is likely to reach more of the poor, and more 
                                                 
10 In 1997, 5.5% of the labour force was employed in the government’s Minimum 
Employment Plan (PEM) at wages equal to one-third of the minimum wage.  This rose to 
8.5% in 1982 (Cortaza, 1997: 237-9).  
11 This assumes that each person works 10 days a month, for R35 a day and that the wage 
bill absorbs 48% of the total resources required to run a national public works programme.  
The 48% wage bill figure was based on the average for the National Economic Forum job 
creation programme between 1992 and 1998.   13
effectively.   A BIG has the added advantage in the context of the AIDS 
pandemic of reaching those who are too ill with AIDS to participate in PWPs. 
 
Given that income-earners are beneficiaries of the current growth path, an 
appropriate social-democratic response may well be higher taxation in order to 
finance a BIG.  Higher taxation was part of the implicit social contract 
embedded in the Scandinavian social-democratic model.  Such ‘social accords’ 
sought to balance the need to maintain profitability (so as to encourage 
investment and ensure sustainable growth) whilst ensuring a reasonable growth 
in wage income and the provision of basic income support and training for the 
unemployed (Nattrass, 1999).   
 
It has been estimated that implementing a full-scale AIDS prevention and 
treatment intervention which provided HAART to all those who needed it, 
would require an increase in resources equivalent to raising VAT by between 3 
and 7 percentage points (depending on what level of care is provided to those 
suffering from AIDS-related illness) (Nattrass and Geffen, 2003).
12  It is, 
however, important to remember that these costs assume a rapid and extensive 
take-up of HAART, and no rationing of AIDS patients in the public sector.  This 
is why this particular estimate is higher than the other available costing studies 
which assume greater rationing and more limited treatment regimens (see Boulle 
et al, 2003).  The estimate was explicitly designed to answer the question of 
what resources were needed to provide treatment to all who need it.  If the 
government decides to provide only a limited, and rationed treatment 
programme, then total costs will be correspondingly lower.     
 
According to Le Roux’s estimates, an increase in VAT of 7% is required to 
finance a BIG.
13  In other words, if both a BIG and a full-scale AIDS 
intervention were to be implemented, this would require a significant increase in 
taxation.  Assuming the cost estimate reported in Nattrass and Geffen (2003), 
the required tax increase would be in the region of increasing VAT by 10 to 14 
percentage points.  Is this feasible?   
 
There is no exact technical answer to this question as different societies tolerate 
different levels of taxation, and at different times.  Welfare expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP has risen with economic development, and in times of crisis 
                                                 
12 The money could of course be raised through income tax rather than VAT.  The discussion 
about taxation is presented here in terms of VAT simply to keep the argument simple.  
13 Le Roux’s (2002) proposed increase in VAT to fund a programme that costs R15 billion is 
larger than the VAT increase required to fund a PWP costing R22.8 billion.  This is because 
the direct (or gross) costs of a BIG (R52 billion) are substantially larger than the net costs.  
By financing the BIG out of an increase in VAT, the tax system will ‘claw back’ the grant from 
richer people because they will end up paying more in expenditure taxes than they benefit 
from the grant.  Le Roux also assumes increases in excise taxes.   14
(such as war) citizens have accepted large increases in taxation as legitimate 
(Seekings, 2003).  The notion of what is and is not ‘affordable’ thus varies 
according to the social and economic context.  Given the scale of the 
unemployment problem and the AIDS epidemic, it is possible (but probably 
unlikely) that reasonable South Africans might agree to an increase in taxation 
so as deal with it.  While this proposal would run counter to the government’s 
orthodox fiscal policies, there are some grounds for believing that the South 
African economy may be able to cope with an increase in the tax take – 
especially given that the negative impact of increased taxation on demand will 
be ameliorated in part by the injection of demand into the hands of the poor 
through the BIG.   
 
According to one (albeit rather optimistic) view, South Africa’s average tax rate 
is “significantly less than that which would be predicted given the country’s 
economic profile” and that “an additional R25 billion per year could be 
mobilised without undermining international competitiveness” (Samson, 2002: 
91).  Assuming (for the point of argument) that this assessment is correct, an 
additional R25 billion could go a long way towards financing both a BIG and a 
large-scale AIDS intervention.  Taking Le Roux’s estimate of R15 billion a year 
for a BIG, and assuming the lower-bound cost estimate of R14.1 billion for a 
full-scale AIDS intervention (Nattrass and Geffen, 2003), we would need to find 
about R4 billion a year in addition to the resources mobilised by this proposed 
increase in taxation.  Some relief could be sought by applying for grants from 
the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria and from other international aid 
agencies.  This was the route followed by Botswana.   
 
Another option is to drive down the costs of the AIDS treatment programme 
through an aggressive approach to drug pricing.  Engaging in Brazilian-style 
negotiations with pharmaceutical companies over the price of antiretrovirals 
would help, as would providing further support for the domestic production of 
generic medication.  Brazil has made a concerted effort to produce generic 
antiretrovirals domestically.  Between 1999 and 2001, the proportion of 
antiretrovirals produced in Brazil rose from 47% (19% of government 
expenditure on antiretrovirals) to 63% (43% of expenditure).  The remainder are 
purchased on the international market, and Brazil has had great success 
negotiating price reductions (Galvao, 2002: 1864).  Brazil has threatened to 
engage in compulsory licensing (i.e. breaking patents) in order to force price 
concessions from pharmaceutical companies.  For example, after it threatened to 
break the patent on Efavirenz,  Merck agreed to a 60% price reduction (loc. cit).  
Brazil has yet to break any patents.  Merely the threat to do so has proved 
sufficient to bring about a significant reduction in costs.  The November 2001 
decision by the World Trade Organisation to allow the use of compulsory 
licensing in cases of national public health emergencies has further strengthened  15
Brazil’s hand – as well as that of other middle-income developing countries (like 
South Africa) which have the industrial capability of producing antiretrovirals if 
necessary.     
 
Even if such measures were introduced, it is important to not that the range of 
policy options needs to be broadened beyond the size and allocation of the 
government budget to address the root cause of the poverty problem in South 
Africa:  high unemployment.  Ideally the government should be proceeding on 
several fronts, such as implementing a BIG and AIDS interventions as well as 
encouraging the expansion of more labour-intensive firms and sectors.   This 
means addressing labour-market policy and the growth path itself.  
 
 
Unemployment and Social Accords:  Lessons from 
International Experience 
 
As argued in Section 1, the South African growth path has become steadily less 
labour absorbing.  The ‘high productivity’ growth strategy has helped foster 
greater skill- and capital-intensity, but it has done nothing to create jobs for the 
many (relatively unskilled) people who need them.  Under the post-apartheid 
distributional regime, labour productivity has grown along with real average 
remuneration and profitability.  Those with jobs have done relatively well, those 
without have born brunt of rising poverty.  Is there anything that can be done to 
make the growth path more receptive to generating employment? 
 
Judging from the international experience of labour-demanding development, 
the following factors seem to help: an export orientation; wage growth slower 
than that of productivity; flexible labour markets; efficient and well-targeted 
state support for key economic sectors; and development oriented 
macroeconomic policies (Nattrass, 2001c).   However, pointing to past 
experience is not always helpful because the economic context may be different 
today than it was in the past (e.g. today’s trade regime rules out a variety of 
government interventions which were used to good effect in the past by newly 
industrialising economies like South Korea), and because the particular social 
and economic context that facilitated a set of labour market policies (such as 
those found in South East Asia) do not exist in South Africa.   
 
More specifically, South Africa has an institutional commitment to tripartite 
forms of negotiation (as evidenced most clearly in the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), South Africa’s peak-level 
tripartite institution) and to encouraging co-operation between labour and capital 
at industry and firm-level.  This sets South Africa apart from other African  16
countries, and most other middle-income economies.  A more useful approach, 
then is to ask what lessons can be learned from recent experience of countries 
which have experienced strong employment growth in a context of consultation 
and co-operation between labour, capital and the state.   The experience of the 
Netherlands, Australia and Ireland is instructive in this regard.  Like South 
Africa, these countries experienced an employment crisis, and like South Africa, 
they had strong trade unions and a tradition of collective bargaining and 
tripartite negotiation.   In each case, the trade union movement made significant 
concessions in order to restore profitability and employment growth.  
 
Figure 4:  Index of Employment Growth in Ireland, Australia, The 
                Netherlands, the European Union, Middle-Income Countries 
                and South Africa 
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     Source:  World Development Indicators (as reported in the WEFA data set). 
 
Broadly speaking, employment can rise if growth increases rapidly, or if the 
growth path becomes more labour-intensive.  If employment is driven by rapid 
growth, then average labour productivity and employment could rise.  The best 
recent example of this high-productivity/high-output/high-employment growth 
path is that of Ireland.  Figure 4 illustrates how rapidly employment grew in 
Ireland.  But as output growth was even more spectacular (see Figure 5), 
average labour productivity (i.e. output per worker) also rose significantly 
(Figure 6).  If, however, the main driver of employment growth is the expansion 
of part-time or low-productivity jobs, then employment could rise faster than 
output, thus resulting in a decline in average labour productivity.  This is the  17
growth path experienced by the Netherlands in the 1980s (see Figures 4, 5 and 
6).  The Australian experience represents something of a middle path between 
the two.  
 
The roots of the Australian ‘Accord’ can be traced to 1982, when a mini 
resources boom (sparked off by the increase in the gold price) lead to excessive 
wage increases, inflation, balance of payments problems and a decline in output 
and employment.  According to the Research Officer of the Australian Council 
of Trade Unions (ACTU), this:  
 
“prompted the union movement to collectively take responsibility for 
putting employment first when framing economic strategy.. (and to 
take) … responsibility for ensuring Australia’s international 
competitiveness in terms of low inflation and falling real unit labour 
costs (1995: 11).  
 
Figure 5:  Index of Output Growth in Ireland, Australia, The Netherlands, 
                the European Union, Middle-Income Countries and South 
                Africa.  
 
75
100
125
150
175
200
225
250
275
300
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
Ireland
Australia
Middle income countries
Netherlands
European Union
South Africa
 
     Source:  World Development Indicators (as reported in the WEFA data set). 
 
The initial phase of the Accord entailed wage restraint in return for lower 
taxation and improved welfare programmes.  But as growth remained sluggish, 
all parties agreed to real wage cuts and declining government expenditure.  This 
was accompanied by a steady decentralisation of wage bargaining to firm level,  18
and greater concentration on improving productivity through workplace and 
industry-level initiatives (Nattrass, 1999).  Trade union support for this dramatic 
shift in strategy was key.  As can be seen in Figures 4, 5 and 6, Australian output 
and employment recovered to grow strongly (along with labour productivity) in 
the 1990s.  
 
Figure 6:  Index of Labour Productivity in Ireland, Australia, The  
                Netherlands, the European Union, Middle-Income Countries   
                and South Africa.  
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     Source:  World Development Indicators (as reported in the WEFA data set). 
 
The Netherlands and Ireland are quintessential examples of the ‘new social 
pacts’ that have arisen recently on ‘apparently arid ground’ in Europe (Rhodes, 
2001: 167).
14  Both have, to varying degrees, entailed the fashioning of 
innovative links between labour-market policy (pertaining to training, 
employment conditions and wage-bargaining), industrial policy, welfare policy 
and taxation.  In each case, the trade union movement made real concessions 
with regard to wage restraint and labour regulation in return for benefits such as 
lower taxation, enhanced representation, skills development and other 
productivity-enhancing policies and measures.      
 
Figure 4 shows that recent employment growth in the Netherlands and Ireland 
compares favourably with that of the European Union (EU) as a whole.  As was 
                                                 
14 Rhodes also includes Italy, Portugal and Spain in his list of new social pacts.  19
the case in Australia, an employment crisis preceded each social accord process.  
A commonly perceived crisis, and recognition amongst all parties that concerted 
action is required to address it, seems to be a precondition for a social accord to 
be struck.    
 
As noted earlier, there is a striking difference between the Irish and Dutch 
experiences with regard to productivity growth.  Rapid rates of growth 
underpinned rising productivity in Ireland, whereas the expansion of jobs (most 
notably through the provision of part-time work for women)
15, in the 
Netherlands resulted in falling, and then slow, productivity growth.  Lower 
average labour productivity is to be expected when employment growth is 
promoted in this way through part-time employment (which amounts to a form 
of job-sharing) and through government-sponsored job creation schemes.   
Productivity-enhancement at firm level is crucial for maintaining growth in 
profits and wages.  But if raising productivity becomes the sole policy objective, 
then there is a danger that the growth path will exclude the many unemployed 
who wish to work.  The Dutch solution to this problem was to ensure that 
productivity-enhancing measures (such as training) were accompanied by 
measures to boost employment – even though this implied lower average labour 
productivity.   
 
The Irish social accord process is the most wide-ranging of the new social 
accords.  It started off as an attempt to restore profitability, investment and 
growth and subsequently expanded in scope to include issues of education, 
health, social welfare as well as incomes.  The first neo-corporatist accord was 
struck in the mid-1980s, when Ireland was mired in slow growth, rising public 
sector deficits and high unemployment.  Subsequent pacts negotiated in 1990, 
1993, 1996-7 and 2000, linked incomes policies to wage restraint and reforms in 
taxation, education, health and social welfare.  Each agreement was preceded by 
the publication of a discussion document prepared by the National Economic 
and Social Council – an advisory body composed of representatives of the social 
partners and senior government officials.  As the pacts developed over time, 
more emphasis was placed on supply-side measures to promote training and 
productivity growth.  Over time, the accord process was expanded to include 
more representatives of civil society. 
 
As is the case in Australia, Irish labour-market and industrial strategy is geared 
towards ‘best practice’ and productivity enhancement.  This resulted in most of 
the agreements being “largely tailored to the demands of the insider unionised 
sector and … protecting the post-tax income of the employed ‘insiders’ 
                                                 
15 In their recent ‘anatomy’ of employment growth in Europe, Garibaldi and Mauro show that 
the success of the Netherlands in creating employment “is largely accounted for by a net 
increase in part-time jobs taken up by women aged 25-49 in the service sector” (2003: 72).    20
(Kavanagh  et al 1997).  ‘Partnership 2000’ was negotiated with a wider 
grouping of social partners, but maintained a strong focus on improving 
industrial democracy and training in an effort to boost productivity through best-
practice and consensual labour relations.  
 
Rapid growth of investment is at the heart of the Irish success story.  Investors 
are interested in profitability and stability/predictability in the business 
environment.  The Irish accords delivered both.  Wage restraint in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s helped ensure that profitability doubled between 1987 and 1996 
(Lane, 1998).  As O’Donnell puts it, “the resulting environment of wage 
moderation and high profitability is almost certainly a key factor in Ireland’s 
employment creation, attraction of inward investment and the unprecedented 
commercial success of indigenous companies” (2001: 11).  
 
The experience of Ireland shows that an inclusive, co-operative growth path 
underpinned by productivity enhancement is possible, but that this has to be 
based on strong growth.  Ultimately, this means ensuring that the economic 
environment remains conducive to investment.  The issue which concerns all 
social accords (new and old) – i.e. ensuring that wages do not squeeze 
profitability too far – is always lurking on the horizon.  When growth slows 
down, this becomes the central issue. 
 
 
3.  A Social Accord in South Africa? 
 
Social accords arise out of a common sense of crisis and recognition of the need 
to restore profitability in order to ensure the sustainable growth of employment 
and income for all.  As shown in Figure 3, both the rate and share of profit in 
South Africa rose for most of the 1990s – so it appears that profitability is being 
restored in the absence of a social accord.  Rather than bargaining with labour 
over their strategy, South African firms are simply responding to the economic 
and policy environment by shedding unskilled labour and by ensuring that wage 
growth is matched by improvements in productivity.   They have, in short, 
succeeded in recreating the conditions for renewed accumulation without an 
explicit commitment on the part of organised labour to wage restraint.    
 
If the only objective of a social accord is to restore profitability, then South 
Africa does not, on the face of it, appear to need one.  If, however, the objective 
is to facilitate a stronger, more labour-demanding and less conflictual growth 
path, then a social accord process could potentially be of value.  An explicit 
agreement on the part of organised labour to restrain wage demands in line with 
productivity growth could help improve the investment climate (as was the case  21
in the Netherlands, Ireland and Australia).  There is thus certainly still room for 
a more co-operative growth path that could benefit both labour and capital.    
 
Such an accord could include the following: 
 
1.  A framework agreement (probably negotiated in NEDLAC) detailing 
agreed parameters for a wage increase.  These could be blanket wage 
increases for all sectors (as in the Irish social accord), or it could be 
stratified by sector.  
2.  Industry-level wage bargains would be constrained by the framework 
agreement and procedures put in place (as in the Irish case) to 
accommodate those firms who cannot afford the wage increases.    
3.  Government continues to provide support for training and skills 
development through its various dedicated industrial and labour 
policies.  
 
But while this kind of ‘insider’ accord could help improve growth at the margin, 
it is unlikely to have much impact in the short- or medium-term on employment.  
As shown by the Irish (and to a lesser extent the Australian) social accord 
processes, the only way for a productivity-based accord to generate significant 
benefits to employment is if growth is tremendously fast (and fuelled by 
domestic and foreign investment).  Such a scenario is unlikely in South Africa 
given the chronic problem of skills bottlenecks.    
 
If South Africa is going to address the employment problem by means of a 
social accord, then it has to be inclusive of labour-market ‘outsiders’.  Whether 
this means broadening the parties to the agreement to include the unemployed 
and civil society organisations, (as in the Irish case), or simply mandating 
government to look after the interests of the unemployed (as in the Netherlands), 
is an open issue.  
 
An inclusive social accord in South Africa would need to support high 
productivity activities – but not at the cost of slower employment growth.   
Training and skills development should continue as this will improve the 
competitiveness of high productivity sectors.  But at the same time, employment 
needs to expand, perhaps in the form of job-sharing, or in lower-wage, labour-
intensive activities and even in government sponsored PWPs.  This will serve to 
reduce average labour productivity – but as the Dutch growth path shows, this 
can be an appropriate outcome if the objective is to address the problem of 
marginalised outsiders by creating jobs for them.  
 
An ‘outsider-friendly’, more inclusive, social accord in South Africa could 
include the following as additional aspects to the accord outlined above:  22
 
4.  Organised labour and business agree to labour-market reforms in order 
to encourage the growth of labour-intensive firms and sectors (e.g. 
setting lower, or no, minimum wages for smaller, more labour-
intensive firms); 
5.  Where other labour legislation can be shown to be harmful to 
employment creation (e.g. rules about retrenchment), then additional 
labour-reforms should be considered; and  
6.  Government agrees to increase the number of PWPs, to remove all 
taxes on employment (e.g. payroll taxes) and to make all AIDS 
prevention and treatment expenditure at firm-level fully tax-
deductable.   
 
Unlike the social accords in The Netherlands, Ireland and Australia which 
provided tax concessions to workers in return for wage restraint, this is not a 
significant or sustainable option in South Africa where the pressure to 
redistribute income through the fiscus is substantial.  Indeed, as noted above, if a 
large-scale government AIDS intervention and a BIG were to be implemented, 
then all income-earners would be faced with a major tax increase.   
   
One of the obstacles facing an inclusive social accord in South Africa is whether 
organised labour is prepared to accept the associated labour-market reforms and 
tax implications of a strategy designed to boost employment.  If South Africa is 
unable to make progress on points 4, 5 and 6 – and concentrates instead on 
‘high-wage, high-productivity’ jobs only, then all that will remain is an ‘insider’ 
accord that supports a growth path that has little, if any, chance of reducing 
unemployment in the foreseeable future.  
 
As highlighted in the above discussion, the social accords in Australia, Ireland 
and the Netherlands saw organised labour making concessions (in terms of 
wage-restraint and labour-market reforms) in return for tax cuts and policies 
designed to promote skills development and training.   In South Africa’s case, 
organised labour has already achieved many of these policy gains.  This was 
helped by COSATU’s alliance with the ANC and by the fact enlightened policy-
making by the Ministries of Labour and Trade and Industry with regard to skills 
development.  More recently, income-earners have been handed tax cuts by the 
Minister of Finance.  Organised labour in South Africa, has, in other words, 
achieved many of the direct benefits typically associated with the new social 
accords – without having to make any concessions.  It is an ironic possibility 
that the South African government may have just missed the opportunity to 
forge a social accord by handing out many of its bargaining chips for free.  
  23
Nevertheless, there is still potential for a social accord process to deliver 
meaningful changes to South Africa’s policy environment and growth path.   
Simply bringing the social partners together to discuss problems has potential 
benefits.  As O’Donnel remarks about the Irish social accord process, the 
benefits extended way beyond bread-and-butter negotiations between labour and 
capital: 
 
“Bargaining describes a process in which each party comes with 
definite preferences and seeks to maximise their gains.  While this is a 
definite part of Irish social partnership, the overall process (including 
various policy forums) would seem to involve something more.   
Partnership involves the players in a process of deliberation that has 
the potential to shape and reshape their understanding, identity and 
preferences” (2001: 5). 
 
South Africa is fortunate in having a strong tradition of social corporatism and a 
national level institution (NEDLAC) that is capable of facilitating discussion 
and negotiation between the social partners.  The main beneficiaries of 
NEDLAC have been labour and capital, but there is potential for drawing in a 
wider range of social interests and constituencies into an accord process.  This 
could be done by expanding and empowering NEDLAC’s ‘Development 
Chamber’ which was set up to facilitate the inclusion of civil society (the 
‘community sector’) in certain negotiations.    
 
AIDS policy has already been the subject of negotiation in NEDLAC.  In July 
2002, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and COSATU requested 
NEDLAC to instigate a process to negotiate a national HIV/AIDS treatment 
programme.  In September that year, the NEDLAC management committee 
established a senior HIV/AIDS task team comprising: high level representatives 
of government (including the Director General of Health and Labour, and the 
Chief Director of HIV/AIDS policy); representatives of organised labour and 
business; and a representative from TAC and the Community Sector Convenor 
of NEDLAC.  Between September and December, the task team met several 
times and drafted a ‘Framework Agreement’ in favour of an AIDS treatment 
intervention.  The process, unfortunately, broke down when government refused 
to sign the agreement – saying variously that there was no agreement, or that as 
government, it was not required to sign anything of the sort.  Rather than 
encouraging social reflection and the participation of civil society in policy 
formation, the government undermined NEDLAC and adopted a technocratic 
approach.  The Health Minister, Tshabalala-Msimang appeared to regard the 
agreement as a challenge to her power to decide health policy.  She was quoted 
in a major national newspaper as saying: “Why must the government enter into 
agreements with everyone? Tomorrow I must enter into an agreement with  24
asthma sufferers?” (Mail and Guardian 21-27 February 2003).  This was 
unfortunate because it forced civil society interest groups (like TAC) to confront 
government through legal action and via high profile civil disobedience 
campaigns (as took place in 2003).   
 
There is, however, some validity to the Health Minister’s complaint – at least in 
so far as it can be read as a concern about government policy being held hostage 
to specific interests (AIDS sufferers, asthma sufferers etc).   This, at least in 
principle, is a potential problem given that not all those with health needs are as 
well represented as people living with AIDS are represented through TAC.   
However, unlike asthma, AIDS poses unique public health challenges to society.  
It is thus appropriate to raise this health crisis in a national forum such as 
NEDLAC (but only if a broad a cross-section of civil society is included in the 
discussions).       
 
Equally important is that the issue of AIDS interventions should not be 
discussed in isolation.  Addressing AIDS entails more than a mere shift in health 
policy, it requires rethinking the way that funding is allocated from the national 
to provincial levels, a reconsideration of spending and taxation decisions, and a 
discussion of the general growth strategy.  It should be an integral part of the 
social accord process to address unemployment.  It is a recipe for disaster if 
AIDS is discussed in one chamber, while an economic social accord is discussed 
in another.   If the two issues are separated, then the trade-offs between spending 
money on (say) PWPs or a BIG or a large-scale AIDS intervention, will not be 
confronted squarely.   It could also result in a less-than-optimal deal regarding 
labour market reforms.   
 
For example, as a result of reasonable deliberation, all parties (labour, business, 
civil society and government) may agree that addressing unemployment and 
combating AIDS through a range of interventions including a full-scale HAART 
programme is necessary and that taxation would have to rise to fund it.  Faced 
with this consensus, labour may well opt for more broad-ranging and extensive 
labour-market reforms than it would otherwise agree to – simply in order to 
spread the load of the required tax increases across a large number of income-
earners.  Organised labour and civil society may also put more pressure on 
government to cut back on unproductive expenditure, such as defence, in order 
to take the burden off the required tax increase.  
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